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Stretching and Challenging the Boundaries of Law: Varieties of 
Knowledge in Biotechnologies Regulation 
 
Abstract 
The paper addresses the question of adaptation of existing regulatory frameworks in the face of 
innovation in biotechnologies, and specifically the roles played in this by various expert knowledge 
practices. We identify two overlapping ideal types of adaptation, first the stretching and 
maintenance of a pre-existing legal framework, and second a breaking of existing classifications and 
establishment of a novel regime. We approach this issue by focusing on varieties of regulatory 
knowledge which, contributing to and parting of political legitimacy, in principle enable the making of 
legally binding decisions about risks and benefits of technologies. We base the discussion around  
two case studies, one of animal biotechnology ethical regulation, the other of 'advanced therapy' 
medicinal product regulation, both in the context of European Union frameworks. Specifically we 
explore the knowledge configurations constituting  expert committees and other institutional 
formations of expert regulatory knowledge in their political context. We show that where sectoral 
and moral boundaries are challenged, different modes of regulatory knowledge beyond scientific 
forms – legal, procedural, moral, economic and industrial – can shape regulatory innovations either 
by maintenance of regimes through commensuration and stretching, or through differentiation and 
separation creating new frameworks. We conclude that establishing an essential techno-scientific 
difference between pre-existing and novel technologies does not in itself require new regulatory 
structures, and that the regulatory strategy that is followed will be determined by a combination of 
different forms of knowledge.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The emergence of new biotechnologies brings many kinds of governance challenges for which 
traditional types of governance, including law-making, are not always sufficient.  Law is often seen as 
unable to keep up with the rapid developments involved, facing difficulties dealing with technical 
uncertainties and rapid scientific evolution. Furthermore, issues of classification between different 
domains of nature, science, materials and products have become a key part of the regulation of 
bioscience and biotechnology in contemporary societies. In this paper we focus on law-making and 
its difficulties of addressing issues related to new technologies by focusing on the concept of 
‘regulatory knowledge’ and its role in law-making. We understand law-making as both the 
negotiating processes of drafting a framework for making legal decisions (such as authorizing and 
licensing), and the interpretive process geared towards ‘implementing’ regulations.   
 
Two different strategies of law-making appear evident, with varying degrees of intentionality in 
practice. A first strategy involves commensuration, an analogical legislative strategy, including new 
provisions in an existing legal framework. A second strategy is to develop new legal frameworks. 
Both strategies require consideration of the strength and usefulness of existing classificatory 
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systems. The development of new legal frameworks is typically informed by expert stakeholders 
claiming specialist knowledge or accompanied by the institution of expert committees that develop 
standards within these new frameworks. In this paper we are interested in the reasons for 
maintaining, stretching, or breaking the pre-existing legal framework and the role that expertise 
plays in this. To what extent can processes of commensuration stretch and thus maintain the pre-
existing legal framework and when is breaking of existing classifications necessary, or what 
knowledge-related factors engender such legal fracturing? By answering this research question, we 
intend to come to a broader understanding of the concept of regulatory knowledge and its role in the 
construction and re-construction of law. We argue from case studies that regulatory knowledge 
encompasses more than scientific knowledge only, and thus that the concept should be broadened 
to include other forms of knowledge that are mobilized in processes of design and implementation of 
law. We do so by exploring various legislative strategies and practices involving the institution of 
expert committees and the workings of other expert knowledge actors as vehicles or channels of 
regulatory knowledge. 
 
We approach the research question by combining a legal perspective with Science and Technology 
Studies (STS) perspectives. We believe that either single disciplinary perspective risks bypassing or 
simplifying relevant elements of problem-definition deriving from the other discipline. Our initial 
assumption is that an answer can be found in a detailed exploration of the process of law-making 
and a critical analysis of the various roles variously defined experts play in this process in providing 
knowledge of multiple forms that is required  for law-making innovations in adapting and reacting to 
new biotechnologies.  
 
 
2. Perspectives and methodology 
Multiple forms of knowledge enter into the formation and adaptation of regulatory regimes. As 
Demortain points out in the introduction to this special issue, there is a need to analyse forms of 
knowledge that are ‘more synthetic, situated and experiential’, compared to the more often 
investigated analytic and quantitative forms of scientific , often risk-related, regulatory knowledge 
(Demortain, 2017). Alongside this, it is important to understand the collective actors and institutional 
forums that are implicated in the knowledge domains of law-making.  One legal analysis on this point 
argues that the characteristics of the emergence of new biotechnologies require flexibility and strong 
public participation to come to agreed ethical principles guiding governance, but that these are 
elements that the rule of law per se cannot provide (Rial-Sebbag and Cambon-Thomsen, 2012). 
However, in legal studies, alternatives for law-making in these fields are explored by developing new 
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legislative approaches (Van der Burg and Brom, 2000).  An interactionist approach to law provides 
such an alternative. This approach understands law as flexible as it is responsive to the needs of 
society (Fuller, 1969; Selznick, 1992). Such responsiveness can be established by broad participation 
of both experts and the public (Poort, 2013). Broad participation in its turn, in principle enlarges the 
democratic legitimacy of law-making in democratic societies. Democratic legitimacy, therefore, 
brings in a (additional) reason for involving a range of experts in law-making. At the same time, it can 
be noted that flexibility itself is not an undisputed good, because it counteracts the need to establish 
clear rules of engagement for participants in particular sectors or technologies - actors involved need 
to ‘know where they stand’. A common strategy to shape law-making to deal with the tensions and 
uncertainties typical of innovative biotechnologies such GM foods or nanotechnology is involving 
claimed and acknowledged experts in decision-making processes. For example, in the EU-regulation 
on GMOs (EC 2001/18), an important role is given to the European Food and Safety Authority (EFSA) 
who are assigned to perform an environmental risk analysis on which licensing can either be granted 
or not. In terms of legitimacy, involving experts is seen in a legal perspective to bring in a substantive 
justification of legal decisions as experts are taken to ‘know more’ about the subject than the law-
maker. Their robust knowledge is seen to be able to legitimate decisions.  Furthermore, societally 
validated experts may be seen to bring in an element of neutrality, refrain from normative judgments 
and build their claims on facts, observation and rational arguments. In other words, experts can be 
accorded and claim a high level of accountability. In summary, a strong reliance on the role of 
scientific and technical experts in addressing complex legislative issues is apparent (Poort 2013, 
chapter 2).  
 
In Science and Technology Studies (STS), on the other hand, the role of scientific expertise in decision 
making concerning technological issues is problematized by in-depth analysis of case studies and 
various models that explore and define the different roles experts might claim and be accorded (for 
example, Collins and Evans, 2002; Jasanoff, 2003; Liberatore and Funtowicz, 2003 ). Assumptions of 
neutrality and lack of bias are questioned, and ‘technical’ advice or decisions are typically analysed as 
in fact ‘political’.  Different forms of specialized expertise and the socioeconomic sources of their 
authority are highlighted. Indeed, concerns about the status of claims to scientific expertise are 
frequently voiced in public (and parliamentary) debate and this is a major topic of interest in STS 
studies. Thus STS studies can contribute equally to an exploration of the role of specialists or 
‘experts’ and their multiple claims to and demonstrations of knowledge in law-making processes. 
Ironically, where the role of experts in legal studies seems to be idealized or simplified, the 
complexity of law-making in much STS seems to be relatively overlooked, with notable exceptions 
(for example, Jasanoff, 2015; Latour, 2012); Faulkner 2012b).  
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In both perspectives, the involvement of scientific or technical experts is connected to knowledge-
claims. From the legal perspective, scientific experts play an important role in bringing in knowledge 
that the legislator lacks or is lacking in general. The STS perspectives criticize the limited 
understanding of scientific experts by showing the complexities related to knowledge claims and 
pinpointing different types of knowledge. We, therefore, consider both perspectives relevant for 
coming to a full, rounded understanding of the concept of regulatory knowledge. There are certain 
forms of knowledge that require or allow regulatory intervention (Demortain, this volume). 
Combining legal and STS perspectives, we can say that the standards of scientific regulatory 
knowledge when aligned with collectively negotiated processes that promote political legitimacy 
enable the making of legally binding and societally acceptable decisions about novel technologies.  
 
In this discussion, therefore, we want to explore the role of multiple forms of regulatory knowledge, 
knowledges shaping regulatory decisions and law-making. We believe that these are relevant for 
creating insights into the reasons for maintaining, stretching, or breaking a legal framework in ways 
that become accepted as legitimate. Starting from first principles, non-scientific types of knowledge 
such as legal knowledge and what might simply be called ‘societal knowledge’ may be important 
parts of ‘regulatory knowledge’ broadly defined, in any given sector or instances of novel technology. 
Whereas, different types of scientific knowledge, for example developmental biology, zoology or bio-
engineering, may be relevant for making legal decisions, one can also consider other knowledge 
forms such  as ‘ethics’ or specialized knowledge of moral values, ‘economic’ knowledge and practical, 
administrative  or ‘procedural’ knowledge for example about  bureaucratic or political processes and 
‘rules of the game’. We aim to show in this paper that these types of knowledge may be as relevant 
for strategies of law-making as different types of scientific knowledge. Clearly, the regulatory 
challenges presented by biotechnology are more far-reaching than merely fitting these 
developments into current legal frameworks. In the EU environment, it also requires re-establishing 
the relation between national regulation and EU-regulation which together form the current legal 
framework.  Both (may) use different categorizations and have various backgrounds as well as roots 
in legal systems.  Consequently, the new technologies and applications of these technologies may 
challenge the categorizations and systems of the law in novel ways.  For example, Mahalatchimy 
et.al. have analysed and compared the regulation of human tissues for medical use in the context of 
‘advanced therapies’ in the UK and in France (Mahalatchimy et.al., 2012). Whereas the challenges in 
France are primarily explained from the human-rights perspective, the UK regulatory challenges were 
captured mainly through licensing procedures. The influence of EU-regulation in each system 
differed.  The balance between EU-regulation and the national legal framework, consequently, needs 
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to be re-established as soon as new rules require implementation, as new developments in 
technology emerges as the influence of both can be different in each legal system. 
 
 Different forms of knowledge may be enshrined in different legal regimes, for example the EU-
Directive on cultivation of GM-crops (2015/412) adopted in 2015 enables EU Member States to 
prohibit or restrict cultivation of GM-crops on their territory, but they can only do so on 
considerations other than safety, as safety measurements are already regulated in Directive 2011/18. 
Understanding the background and basis of these boundaries is relevant for shaping new regulatory 
frameworks or fitting the new technological developments into the existing one by commensurative 
strategies. Thus, regarding ‘legal’ knowledge being a type of regulatory knowledge, legal principles 
need to be taken into account to assure predictability and legal clarity (Fuller, 2001; Dworkin, 1993) 
and existing frameworks cannot be bypassed.  
 
Evidence about and representation of society’s concerns (societal knowledge) is also in principle 
required for law-making and, thus can be understood as constituting  part of the sum of   regulatory 
knowledge. Societal knowledge we take to refer to the values and concerns among different 
groupings within society as these are relevant for debate and possible acceptance of technologies. 
‘Social facts’, scenarios and visions for development are equally relevant for law-making (Poort, 
2013, chapter 2). Societal knowledge provides insights into the context in which both the law or 
regulatory framework and the new technology will function and develop. These issues typically are 
characterized by both a lack of consensus on scientific and biological facts as well as on social values. 
We return to a discussion of these and other different forms of ‘regulatory’ knowledge in discussing 
two  case studies, below. We note at the outset that scientific specialists in particular fields may 
deploy these other forms of regulatory knowledge, or claims to such knowledge, to varying degrees, 
as well as their discipline-based technical expertise. 
 
In light of these guiding principles, we take an approach that regulatory knowledges of the types 
outlined above are likely to be relevant for pinpointing the reasons for and factors affecting 
maintaining, stretching, or breaking pre-existing legal frameworks, and conversely, study of the 
dynamics of legal framework innovations will inform understanding of the roles of regulatory 
knowledges and expertise. We will draw on two case studies of biotechnological innovations to 
explore the dimensions of regulatory knowledge and the role of experts in the negotiating phase of 
law-making as well as the role of experts in the framework of legal decision-making (especially 
licensing aspects). In doing so we build on previous study by each author, developing them further by 
focusing on the parts played by knowledges and various kinds of experts. We therefore present  two 
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case studies that, as we shall show, highlight not only scientific knowledge but also other knowledge 
resources mobilised in regulatory and law-making processes.  Regulatory regimes tend to be 
characterized by distinct patterns and types of knowledge and expertise, and our case studies in two 
substantive innovative scientific domains help us understand more thoroughly how different 
expertise informs the sociopolitical processes of both regulatory design and regulatory practice. 
Taking our case studies in turn, therefore, we refer first to research on regulating Advanced Therapy 
Medicinal Products (ATMP) within the EU. We show that commensuration as a legislative strategy of 
analogy is central (Faulkner, 2012a) to law-making in this case. Commensuration is a strategy of 
‘making things the same’ by ‘classifying technologies by drawing attention to the aligning of 
otherwise distinct cognitive or practical domains’, including in this instance notable non-scientific 
knowledge domains. By doing so, the regulatory framework is stretched so that applications of new 
technologies may fit in. In other words, flexibility is created. In this research, additionally, a moral 
challenge to the scope of the Regulation was important to the legal debate, and the resolution of this 
evoked a particular form of regulatory knowledge that we discuss below. Our second case study is on 
the regulation of animal biotechnology in Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. In this 
threefold comparison the focus is on the role of expert committees in drafting the law. To what 
extent are expert committees institutionalised What kinds of experts are involved? What was their 
role in law-making? To what extent did they build on pre-existing legal frameworks or develop new 
ones?  Following our presentation of the case studies, in section 4, we discuss the roles of various 
kinds of experts  and knowledges in law-making that the cases display. In this discussion we touch 
upon socio-legal studies undertaken in the context of the concept of regulatory knowledge, 
pinpointing the benefits of a combined legal and STS approach. Furthermore, we discuss the 
implications of the previous sections for the concept of regulatory knowledge.  
 
3. Two Case Studies 
 In this section, we describe the two case-studies mentioned above that illustrate the challenges of 
regulating new technologies, pointing out the different types of, and roles played by, different forms 
of knowledge mobilized in practical and policymaking regulatory work, and the actors that embody 
them. 
 
The Advanced Therapy Medicinal Products (ATMP) Regulation and the Tissue-Engineered Products 
case 
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The ATMP Regulation1 applies broadly in the field of ‘regenerative medicine’ (although the 
Regulation itself does not mention this term), widely envisaged as being a revolutionary medical 
development, and including various cell, tissue,  medical device and gene therapy innovations that 
are the subject of huge worldwide research and public investment. From a legal perspective it is a lex 
specialis, amending an existing Directive, and this is significant, signaling as it does the relationship to 
an existing, ‘inherited’ piece of legislation. Here, we consider the ATMP Regulation in two aspects, 
first examining key points from the negotiation of the Regulation through the EU political process 
and the forms of knowledge deployed in this process, and secondly considering its subsequent 
implementation through various regulatory institutional forms and actions and their claimed expert 
knowledge practices. Different forms of regulatory expertise and its institutional organization are 
shown in each case. 
 
First, one of the purposes of the ATMP regulation was to make legal provision for placing on the 
market tissue engineered (TE) technologies with medical product application. TE technologies 
typically combine manufactured biomaterials with living, viable human tissues or cells. The 
manufactured part would be classified as a ‘medical device’ for regulatory purposes, requiring the 
application primarily of various branches of engineering and biomaterials knowledge. The TE 
technology was widely believed to fall into a ‘regulatory gap’. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
multiple different definitions of TE technology were circulated and this was crucial to the 
development of regulatory activity that has attempted to classify the technology and define a clear 
regulatable domain for it. In this context, it was widely believed amongst the relevant expert medical 
device regulatory and policy actors that a specific, standalone regulatory regime for this class of 
products was appropriate and would be put in place.  In other words, a breaking of the inherited 
legislative regime was envisaged, due to the technological mateial itself being portrayed as radically 
different from those regulated under existing medicines and ‘devices’ regimes. However, this 
proposal for a separate TE regulatory authority was not implemented. The reason for this lay in a 
commensurating (stretching and maintaining) strategy that emerged from the European 
Commission.  
 
In order to understand this switch from a breaking model to a maintaining model it is necessary to 
know that within the European Commission’s then DG Enterprise, which was leading the 
development of new regulation, there was a division of technical regulatory expertise applicable to 
                                                          
1 Regulation (EC) No 1394/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on 
advanced therapy medicinal products and amending Directive 2001/83/EC and Regulation (EC) No 726/2004, 
OJ L 324 (ATMP Regulation). 
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medical products between pharmaceutical and medical device domains,organized into separate 
sections. An advisory Medical Devices Expert Group (MDEG), representing EU member states, 
comprised engineers  from a variety of specialisations, device experts from national authorities, 
physicians, and technical product assessors for example with specialist knowledge in metals, plastics 
and bio-materials. Unlike medical devices, however, pharmaceuticals were already represented by 
central EU regulatory expertise in the form of the Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use 
(CHMP) in the then European Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA), comprising a wide variety of 
technical expertise including Member State nominated representatives for biochemistry, drug safety 
assessment, pharmacology, toxicology, and medical specialisms such as cardiology,  The initial 
responsibility for developing regulation lay with the medical devices section, but this was superseded 
by the pharmaceutical section, amidst controversial debates about the material classification of the 
nature of the products themselves. The pre-existence of the central EMEA, with no equivalent for 
medical devices, as well as the powerful influence of pharmaceutical industry lobbying were certainly 
instrumental in this change of direction. Therefore, an initial principle based on the riskiness of the 
provenance of the biomaterials used was superseded by one based on the mode of action of the 
products (Faulkner, 2012b). This pulled TE into a stretched pharmaceutical framework, 
commensurating a ‘coherent ensemble’ comprising tissue engineering, cell therapy and gene therapy 
as ‘ATMPs’. However, this was not a move arising purely from scientific or technical regulatory 
knowledge, as shown for example by the explanatory preamble to the Regulation which asserted 
that one of the rationales for the ‘coherence’ of the ‘ensemble’ was the claim that: ‘Advanced 
therapy products are usually developed by innovative small and medium-sized enterprises, highly-
specialised divisions of larger operators in the Life Science sector (biotechnology, medical devices 
and pharmaceuticals), hospitals or tissue banks. They are subject to rapid and often radical 
innovation’ (EU Monitor, 2005) – an economic, sectoral, rather than scientific knowledge claim, 
produced in-house from DG Enterprise.  The EC’s ‘public consultation’ with claimed expert 
stakeholders from different medical products sectors, was also key to this shift, enhancing the 
legitimacy of the outcome. That the technical debate focused to a large extent around the 
biomedical materials and how they act biologically – pharmaceuticals by metabolic and chemical 
action, and devices by mechanical or physical action – shows the deployment of regulatory 
knowledge as ‘politics (or economics) by other means’  (cf. Bloor et al, 2013). This, allied with the 
pre-existing central EMEA shows that the commensurating strategy was co-produced through an 
interaction of institutionalised political power and scientific-technical product ambiguities. The 
primary outcome was a new Committee for Advanced Therapies (CAT) instituted within the 
European Medicines Agency, which nevertheless  acknowledges the sectoral conflicts in the process 
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by allowing for some representation of medical devices expertise when ‘combination products’ (cells 
+ device) are presented. 
 
Alongside this example of pharmaceutical regulatory knowledge dominating a new field through 
regulatory policy committees and interest representation, the debate of the proposed ATMP 
Regulation through the European Parliament provided examples of different forms of regulatory 
expertise and different concerns, including moral issues. The public health parliamentary committee 
(called ENVI) that led the debate of the ATMP Regulation was led by a MEP with Christian religious 
convictions who, together with another MEP with similar convictions, attempted to exclude from the 
Regulation certain types of human material, notably human embryonic stem cells. Such matters were 
termed ‘the ethical issues’ in the debate (Faulkner et.al. 2006). It is notable that both these MEPs 
were in fact medically qualified, the former as an anaesthetist and the latter as a physician, thus 
qualifying them as bringing to the debate technical medical expertise deemed relevant to the 
regulatory case at hand. This movement, however, was successfully opposed by a majority which was 
led by a Social Democrat lawyer MEP, who drew on her knowledge and legal expertise in the working 
of parliamentary process to turn the majority to the social ethics of patients’ access to future 
healthcare therapies as the overriding principle. In terms of regulatory knowledge, therefore, we can 
see a form of practical, procedural political ‘nous’ (know-how based on experience) form of 
knowledge, allied with ‘legal’ knowledge, being mobilized here. 
 
Turning to the implementation of the ATMP regulation, it is notable that much of the expert 
committee CAT’s work has been on classification of proposed products and that this has proved 
much less clear-cut than anticipated. A high degree of uncertainty continues to exist around the 
workability of the definitional boundaries between tissue engineered and cell therapy products.  At 
the same time, conflicts over the relatively light representation of medical device expertise, and over 
the high degrees of uncertainty in the developing science base have produced pressures for a high 
level of engagement with stakeholders with expertise relevant to regulation , taking the form of a 
large number of consultative mechanisms and ‘soft’ interactions with the regulatory agency and 
committee. The constitution of the CAT is noteworthy in terms of the regulatory expertise 
represented. In particular, it was assumed that a scientific and technical membership would be able 
to act on ethical aspects and, therefore, there is no professional ethicist representative nor 
‘members of the public’, although there are two seats for patient group representation. Otherwise, 
individual members’ regulatory expertise is quite complex, typically combining a disciplinary 
knowledge such as pharmacology or molecular and cell biology, or clinical disciplines such as 
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obstetrics/gynaecology, with ‘regulatory science’ knowledge such as clinical trial design and 
medicines evaluation methodology.  
 
Again, although the knowledge-base of the constitution of the CAT is almost entirely scientific and 
technical, it and its members act in ways that go beyond those boundaries. Exemplifying the soft 
regulatory knowledge debates,  an ‘EMA/CAT-Notified Body Collaboration Group’ was established, 
bringing together pharma medicinal and device bioengineering expertise (Notified Bodies are 
technical organisations assessing safety, risk etc. of medical devices in the EU system). The primary 
remit of this was to provide ‘overview, coordination and (identify) the need for any update of any 
process and guidance for consultation of a notified body for medical devices during an assessment 
undertaken by the CAT’.  Another example of what has been called this ‘institutional proliferation’ 
process (Faulkner, 2012a) is a novel linking by the EMA between the CAT and scientific learned 
societies. The first such meeting, formulated as a ‘workshop’, which was attended by some 200 
people, was between the CAT and the European Society for Gene and Cell Therapy. This and other 
similar consultative developments, highlight both the scientific uncertainty in the emerging field, 
(arguably) a democratisation of scientific expertises, and a strategy of containing conflict through a 
form of inter-institutional commensuration. In such institutional processes, it is clear that there is an 
entangling of a range of scientific, clinical and regulatory knowledge forms in ‘political’ debates 
involving disciplinary and sectoral interest, another example of the entanglement of regulatory 
knowledges and interest-driven political strategy.. However, overall the overarching pharmaceutical 
regulatory regime has been preserved, albeit in a context of uncertain and contested scientific 
knowledges in interaction with regulatory policy development. 
 
 
Regulating animal biotechnology: a comparison between Switzerland, Denmark and the 
Netherlands 
 
Poort, in our second case study, compared the regulation on animal biotechnology in three different 
European countries: Switzerland, Denmark and the Netherlands. By use of these case studies, Poort 
intended to identify alternative strategies for regulating complex issues in the field of biotechnology.  
One of the focus-points in her research was to what extent the moral challenges were addressed in 
regulatory processes. In the context of this paper, we focus on the analysis that relates to expert 
involvement in regulatory practice. In all three countries, during the legislative procedure various 
expert committees were involved. It would exceed the extent of the paper to go into detail about all 
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these committees and various roles they have played.2 Therefore, we limit ourselves to discussing 
regulatory practice in which decisions on the use of animal biotechnology are made on a case-by-case 
basis. In all three countries, animal biotechnology was regulated by a licensing procedure. Animal 
biotechnology brings in novelties regarding risks and safety requirements as well as challenges to the 
moral status of animals. For both types of novelties it seemed clear that a standalone regulatory regime 
was required, separated from the existing regulations on animal experiments, as was the case with the 
initial vision for tissue-engineered medical products described in the ATMP case above, although moral 
issues were not the critical driver in that case. 
 
In the Dutch context it was entirely the moral challenges that portrayed animal biotechnology as being 
different from animal experiments. These moral challenges that animal biotechnology brought in were 
incentives to break with the existing legal framework for experiments and draft a separate regulatory 
framework in the Animal Health and Welfare Law in 1997 and to appoint the dedicated Dutch Ethics 
Committee on Animal Biotechnology (CAB). The CAB consists of nine experts from various fields such 
as social science, biotechnology, medical science and ethics, however it is notable that there is no 
specific representation of legal expertise. The CAB was assigned to advise on cost-benefit evaluation 
in concrete cases as well as to give advice on how to address the novel challenges to the moral status 
of animals. In regulatory practice, however, the CAB has had a prominent role in licensing. Officially, 
the Minister was responsible for licensing taking into account the advices of the CAB. The Minister 
made draft decisions building on the CAB’s recommendations. These draft decisions were open to 
public objections in a public consultation procedure officially organized by the Minister. In regulatory 
practice, the CAB chaired these public consultation procedures. After these hearings, the CAB may or 
may not revise its recommendations and send it again to the Minister. Building on these 
recommendations, the Minister then decided whether or not to grant a license. In reality, it was the 
CAB that decided as the Minister, without exceptions, adopted the advice of the CAB.  
 
The moral challenges acted as strong incentives for breaking with the existing regulatory framework, 
which became most visible, when in 2009, the Dutch Minister decided that the CAB’s task was fulfilled: 
the moral status of ‘animal’ in light of animal biotechnology did not require further exploration. From 
that time on, animal biotechnology has been regulated within the existing regulatory framework of 
animal experiments by use of some additional provisions (Poort, 2013). The Dutch case here, 
therefore, provides an interesting example of both separation and commensuration. In the first 
instance, the moral challenges are incentives to develop a standalone regulation for animal 
                                                          
2 For more thorough analysis which includes the legislative procedure, we refer to Poort, 2013, chapter 5, 6 and 7.  
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biotechnology. At the same time, as soon as these moral challenges were crystallized, the legislator 
seemed to adjust to existing regulation. In other words, an ultimate strategy of commensuration is 
preferred. Commensuration here has several benefits as it makes the licensing procedure relatively 
easy: adapting to inherited regulations is more efficient as similar institutions and experts can be 
consulted. 
 
The role of moral values in portraying animal biotechnology provides a good example of the Dutch 
legal culture in which no explicit distinction is made between law and morality and in which different 
types of rule-setting are intertwined (Poort, 2013, Chapter 7). The Dutch legal culture is not only one 
of clear-cut rules, but leaves room for alternative dynamics and soft interactions in regulatory practice. 
The role of the CAB illustrates an integrated process of rule-setting in which both scientific knowledge 
and societal knowledge are balanced in a cost-benefit analysis.    
 
In Switzerland, both moral challenges and novelties in risks and uncertainties were relevant for 
regulating animal biotechnology in a distinct regulatory framework drafted in the Gene Technology 
Law (2004). In this framework, both the Swiss Ethics Committee on Non Human Gene Technology 
(ECNH) and the Swiss Federal Expert Committee for Biosafety (SECB) were assigned to advise the Swiss 
Minister on cost-benefit evaluations in concrete cases either on the moral impact of issues concerning 
non-human gene technology, although in separate sections. The ECNH consists of twelve members 
from different fields of expertise including biotechnology, social science, medical science, ethics, and 
law. The ECNH was established in 1998, but was given a specific mandate in the licensing procedure 
on biotechnological procedure with animals by the Gene technology Law (GTL) in 2004. Given that it is 
an ethics committee, as such, it is perhaps surprising that there is only a single professional ethicist.  
The SECB on the other hand consists of around 16 members who have scientific expertise in the areas 
of biotechnology, gene technology, the environment and health, and represent various protection and 
exploitation interests. The SECB is a permanent federal advisory committee that advises the Federal 
Council on drafting of laws, ordinances and recommendation concerning licenses taking into account 
the protection of people and the environment in the biotechnology and gene technology sector. In 
Switzerland, the Biotechnology Section of the Federal Office for the Environment is responsible for 
licensing. The consultation process starts with a round focused on biosafety risks in which the SECB is 
consulted. After this round of consultation, the ECNH is consulted on moral challenges related to the 
biotechnological procedures. The ECNH is not obliged to advise on each license application. The ECNH, 
therefore, restricts itself to controversial or new issues raised by particular applications (Errass, 2006). 
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In Switzerland a clear distinction is made between scientific knowledge and the moral challenges 
involved. The consultative mechanisms regulated in the GTL contain distinct sections in which different 
expert stakeholders are involved with different tasks. This approach gives room to perform according 
to the expertise they have: the ethical experts have a more signaling function with ‘soft’ interactions, 
while the scientific experts can advise according to the standards as put down in the regulatory 
framework.  
 
Thus Swiss case shows an approach to animal biotechnology which combines both strategies of 
commensurating and breaking the existing regulatory framework. The high degree of uncertainty and 
controversies that continues to exist are excluded from the current decision-making process in 
licensing, while at the same time these issues are not excluded from the broader (political and public) 
debate (Poort, 2013, Chapter 6). On the one hand, the legislator seem to adapt to existing structures 
of licensing and risk evaluation reflected in the terms of references of the SECB who need to be 
consulted for each licensing application.  On the other hand, by drafting a distinct regulation on gene 
technology, the complexity of gene technology is acknowledged. At the same time, the ‘ethical debate’ 
and the signaling function of the ECNH are ‘soft’ mechanisms outside the regulatory framework as the 
ECNH is not obliged to advise in each licensing procedure.   
 
In Denmark, biotechnological procedures with animals are regulated in the Act on the Cloning and 
Genetic modification of Animals (2005). In this Act, the exclusive purposes for using animal 
biotechnology are listed. By listing these purposes a differentiation between biotechnology and 
experiments with animals is made. Remarkable is, however, that despite this differentiation between 
biotechnology and experiments, the same institution is appointed to decide upon licensing: the Animal 
Experiment Directorate. The Animal Experiment Directorate consists of eleven members which 
contains one judge as chairman, five scientists and five members of animal protection organizations, 
although no formal or professional ethics expertise is represented, nor range of their possible 
viewpoints.Due to this assembly, various viewpoints, which extend well beyond elaborations on the 
scientific aspects, can be brought forward during the licensing procedure.  
 
However, despite the possibilities of this broad assembly, the relevant knowledge for licensing is in 
practice restricted to merely scientific aspects. The moral challenges as well as the social impact do 
not have a role in licensing: no distinct ethics committee for licensing is appointed. According to the 
members of the Directorate, the moral challenges were already dealt with during the legislative 
process. During the legislative process, the Danish Animal Ethics Council was consulted about the 
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moral impact of animal biotechnology. Their advices on the moral status of animals are reflected in 
the differentiation in specific research purposes for which licenses are allowed.  
 
The only main difference in licensing between animal biotechnology and animal experiments, 
therefore, is a different form that scientists have to fill in, in which the limitation to four research 
purposes is listed. The benefits of adapting to an existing and well-functioning regulatory framework 
is that the Animal Experiment Directorate has, during the years, developed standards on how to deal 
with the licensing applications. These standards concern requirements on how to protect animal 
welfare and health. The Directorate has adapted these standards for animal biotechnology licensing 
too. As a result, the licensing procedure was not problematic and did not lead to heated debates. The 
standards as developed in context of animal experiments could additionally provide safeguards in 
animal biotechnology. Notably, it was the scientists of the committee that played the dominant role. 
The regulatory strategy here is, thus, one of commensuration in which the boundaries are stretched in 
such way that additional scientific knowledge is included. Commensuration as such ensures that the 
acknowledged experts have a decisive say in licensing. This strategy is both efficient and ensures 
sufficient knowledge and thus legitimacy. At the same time, this strategy also makes it difficult to give 
room to continuous moral challenges in which other types of knowledge may be required. The Danish 
legal culture, however, is not designed in such a way that alternative strategies have room to stimulate 
continuous debate on moral or social challenges or in ‘soft’ interactions. In this sense, the regulatory 
process per se has been de-politicised. Regulation needs to be straight-forward and consist of clear 
standards. Morality and social concerns can have a role in the broader political process leading to 
legislation, but are separated into different institutional arenas matters in light of concrete legal 
decision-making (Ross, 2004).   
 
 
4. The role of experts and knowledge in regulatory strategies 
 
Our case studies show the roles of different knowledges and expertise being mobilized in different 
patterns of regulatory and legal flexibility and innovation. Our discussion assesses the extent to 
which flexibility can be stretched and the knowledge-related factors leading to maintaining existing 
regimes or instituting new, separate ones. Rial-Sebagg  et. al. criticize the limits of the legal 
frameworks lacking flexibility and lacking broad participation when dealing with new technology 
developments (Rial-Sebbag and Cambon-Thomsen, 2012). Their criticism points to a need to adapt 
ethical principles in regulating technology. In other words, regulatory knowledge includes knowledge 
of the ethical principles involved.  Additionally, they note the need to develop strategies anticipating 
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the emergence of new technologies. Flexibility conflicts with the traditional legal principles such as 
legal clarity and predictability. In legal theory, therefore, an important point of debate involves 
whether flexibility can be integrated in the regulatory framework. Rial-Sebbag et.al.  argue that this 
need for flexibility cannot be found in the legal; however, institutionalizing ethics offers an 
alternative. Poort, on the other hand, has analyzed regulatory strategies in which flexibility was 
established in the legal domain; by the use of open norms that require further interpretation in 
regulatory practice (soft mechanisms). Likewise, Faulkner has pointed to the deployment of a variety 
of legislative drafting tactics in the ATMP Regulation, which make for substantive flexibilities, future-
oriented open-endedness and legally protected spaces for institutional responsiveness to techno-
scientific innovations (Faukner, 2012c).   
 
In the previous section we have illustrated, through two case-studies, two common strategies on 
how to deal with the emergence of new technologies which both include societally acknowledged 
experts and various forms of regulatory expertise. First of all, in the ATMP (tissue engineered 
product) case we observed a strategy of commensuration by which new technologies are fitted in the 
current legal framework (maintaining though stretching the inherited legal framework).  Second, the 
comparative study on regulating animal biotechnology showed besides commensuration, also a 
second strategy: drafting new regulations (breaking the legal framework). The usual starting-point 
for legislators, though not all stakeholders, is to see whether new technologies can fit in the current 
legal framework and whether the same expert structures can be re-assigned. For example, when 
regulating animal biotechnology in Denmark, legislators have appointed the same expert committee 
which was already responsible for licensing of animal experiments. The reason to appoint the same 
committee was that the members of this committee were seen as the experts in the field: Why not 
make use of their expertise (maintaining)? At the same time, research on genetic modification of 
animals is regulated in a different regulatory framework than animal experiments as the technologies 
were found to differ on a fundamental level and to challenge different boundaries (breaking). 
Furthermore, genetic modification brings in novel risks that may not be covered in the current 
regulatory framework. In the Netherlands and in Switzerland, new expert committees were 
institutionalized due to these differences on the more fundamental levels and the lack of knowledge 
about future risks (Poort 2013). The need to include insights about the moral challenges were an 
incentive to appoint a different type of expert committee with a different task and composition. Both 
the Netherlands and Switzerland introduced ethics committees to deal with the differences on the 
more fundamental level. Ethics as such is seen as a specific kind of expertise and a specific type of 
knowledge required to make legal decisions.  In the ATMP case, a new multidisciplinary scientific and 
evaluative regulatory committee was created as detailed above, but located within an existing over-
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arching committee and regulatory institution, with broader expertise (for example including a non-
science lawyer), responsibility and authority.  
 
 
In general, we can say, if the issue appears to be, or is successfully argued to be, ‘too different’, a 
new framework is designed. Being ‘different’ can be characterized by uncertainties and unknown 
consequences and risks, but it may not necessarily need to. Being ‘different’, or ‘too different’, can 
also be based on sufficient scientific knowledge, social knowledge, or other forms of knowledge.  
Based on this knowledge, the new technology or entity is classified as being ‘different’, or, indeed, 
sufficiently similar to existing entities. Such difference or similarity may be seen to pertain to 
substantive characteristics inherent in the technology, its moral meanings or its anticipated features 
or consequences in society and the economy.  Qualifying a technology or an entity produced or 
created by a new technology as being different or ‘substantially equivalent’ to use a product 
regulators’ term, in such ways, implies that it is compared with another technology or entity for its 
commensurability, and raises of course the political issue of which stakeholder actors are able to 
achieve such qualification in given regulatory domains. There are no clear directions on what it 
means to be ‘too different’, which means that stakeholders’ power, resources and claimed expertise 
become crucial, pointing to the key role of forms of regulatory knowledge beyond the scientific and 
technological.  Besides, as is clear in both our cases, the two ideal-type strategies are not mutually 
exclusive: a combination of the two strategies is used though tending one way or the other; new law, 
existing institutions; inherited, adapted law, new institutions. 
 
 Similarly, it has been noted in related fields that there has been a need for novel ‘hybrid’ 
institutional arrangements when dealing with issues that concern hybrid trans-species entities 
(Brown and Michael, 2004). Although commensuration seems most pragmatic, the process of 
commensuration seems frequently to complicate regulation even more. Stokes (2012) argues that 
adapting existing regulation may contribute to an easy but possibly premature acceptance of 
(nano)technology. At the same time, she questions whether the current regulations offer enough 
safeguards against possible harm, emphasizing that adapting old regulatory frameworks to new risks 
may result in ‘deeply-seated issues of ill-fitting regulatory orientations’ (Stokes, 2012, p.98). 
Following Hisschemoller and Hoppe, it is like addressing an unstructured problem as if it is 
structured, using old structures that were used to address other issues (Hisschemoller and Hoppe, 
1995).  Applying old regulatory measures to new regulatory problems risks bypassing fundamental 
debate about the desirability and applications of new technology innovations. Furthermore, we can 
doubt whether the old rules can address new risks that come along with the new technology. The 
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evidence of ‘soft’ or informal interactions with a range of different scientific expertise, around the 
formal legislative and regulatory work, shows a learning process in which legal innovation and 
scientific-biotechnological innovation are co-produced. The intervention of legal knowledge, industry 
sector knowledge, economic knowledge, and knowledge of political procedure are also all 
exemplified in our case studies. Such participative interactions, in the context of democratic societies 
at least, builds legitimacy for the legal and regulatory enterprise. 
 
Each regulatory system has different cultural and industrial sectoral backgrounds, classification 
systems and participants’ expectations. Every attempt to fit a new technology into a pre-existing 
framework, will re-challenge old classifications and established relations between legal systems, and 
the associated knowledges embedded in these systems and mobilized by their range of participants. 
We draw similar conclusions in the contexts of the ATMP and the Danish case of regulating animal 
biotechnology. In the case of products to be covered by the ATMP Regulation, a new 
commensurating regime was instituted, but this was done under the umbrella of the existing 
pharmaceutical legislation. Stretching of the pharmaceutical regime and its associated sciences and 
technological knowledge to embrace tissue engineered products and combination products including 
a ‘device’ component has indeed led to continuing problems of conflict with the expectations and 
sectoral knowledge and expertise of medical device industry producers. In Denmark, the authority 
that is responsible for animal experiments was also appointed to decide on licensing concerning 
animal biotechnology. Their task did not change, the members were further assigned for tasks 
reviewing in a licensing procedure,  building on a risk assessment. The members could easily adjust to 
existing standards that function in animal experiment practice. The implementation of the new 
licensing procedure was, therefore, unproblematic. In both the the Danish and ATMP case studies, 
expert organizations, forums and committees play an important role in the regulatory regimes. Either 
new expert committees are institutionalized (as the ATMP) or existing ones are appointed to deal 
with the novel technologies (as in animal biotech). These expert committees either have an advisory 
role beyond scientific regulatory knowledge in the legislative procedure, or have a role in the case-
by-case review procedure which is commonly implemented when dealing with technology issues. A 
review procedure gives room in principle to identify all interests, engage stakeholders and to reflect 
upon all risks on a case by case basis. However, in the Danish case study, the expert committee, 
consisting of members with different scientific backgrounds either representing different interests, 
merely focused on risk assessment following a technological perspective. As was argued, the 
fundamental ethical challenges were already dealt with in the legislative procedure. Expertise, for 
that matter, remains focused on the scientific. In the ATMP case the expert CAT committee’s primary 
role has been to classify types of medical product so that the required test and trial data can be 
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defined, to produce opinions on safety and efficacy of products, and to recommend or deny market 
authorisations. However, as has been seen, the committee has acted far more widely than this 
technical remit, arguably deploying ‘political’ knowledge for example in instigating multi-stakeholder 
meetings both to present the current state of regulatory rules and associated guidance and to 
develop them through the contributions of multiple scientific experts in a field of high scientific 
uncertainty and contested interests. This high degree of stakeholder engagement undoubtedly builds 
political legitimacy for the evolving regulatory guidance that is co-produced in ‘implementing’ the 
ATMP legal framework.  
 
Both our case studies yield examples of the relationship between the deployment of scientific 
knowledge and ethics expertise. This relation deserves specific commentary. Regulatory practice that 
we have described shows us that institutions involved in the legal review procedure are designed in 
such a way that decision-making builds on scientific knowledge focusing on safety requirements 
(Holmberg and Ideland, 2012), but that, at the same time, these institutions (officially) include room 
for discussion about ethical desirability. As soon as new technologies give rise to moral concerns and 
public debate, either ethics committees are installed and institutionalized, or a strategy for handling 
ethics is designed. The novel nature of the technology clearly plays an important role. In the Dutch 
case, the biotechnological procedures with the use of animals were regulated in a new regulatory 
framework because of both the lack of scientific knowledge about risks and the moral complexity. 
The terms of reference of the ethics committee were to advise on a case-by-case basis about the 
moral concerns as well as to identify the moral status of animals. In Switzerland both a Committee on 
Biosafety and an Ethical Committee on Non-Human Gene technology were involved in licensing on 
the use of animals in biotechnological procedures. In the ATMP case, specialist ethics was not 
enrolled into the new Committee for Advanced Therapies, however the ATMP Regulation set up 
patient group membership of the committee and expected ethical aspects to be discussed also by 
the range of scientific expertise constituted. Although the functioning of certain committees has 
been criticized for its lack of a thorough moral analysis (Poort et. al., 2013), the acknowledgment of 
moral complexity as such plays a role in institutionalizing novel expert committees, also in the field of 
ethics itself. Although we can identify several similarities in the three approach to animal 
biotechnology, we also noticed differences in approach: the role of ethics committees, the role of 
scientific experts, the room for fundamental debate and the reasons for choosing a certain strategy. 
These differences cannot be explained by the differences in knowledge gaps as those case studies 
concern similar technologies in a similar time period with equal access to scientific knowledge. It 
seems that in such cases another feature is of importance for deciding whether or not to draft new 
regulation or fit into the existing legal framework: legal knowledge.  
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Legal knowledge implies knowledge about the legal system, the legal categorizations and the 
background of a legal framework. In the comparative study on animal biotechnology, it became clear 
that also the legal culture in which a new technology is regulated is relevant for maintaining, 
stretching or breaking the existing legal framework.  For example, in the Netherlands, in which there 
is more room for alternative regulatory mechanisms, the legislator has chosen a more radical 
breaking with the existing legal framework than in Denmark. In Denmark, instead, a licensing 
procedure similar to animal experiments was followed with only small additions to the existing 
framework. This strategy is in line with the Danish pragmatic approach to regulation, in which rules 
have to be clear-cut and provide clear standards. The Dutch legal culture leaves more room for open-
endedness and flexibility in ‘soft’ interactions. Equally, at EU level in the case of the ‘political’ 
negotiation of the ATMP Regulation, the crucial role was described of a lawyer MEP’s expertise, in 
turning the debate on principles of social morality, drawing on knowledge of the informal dimensions 
of the legislative process in the EU policymaking environment. As Stokes convincingly states, when 
adapting to old rules, also the broader policy setting with all its values, goals, intentions and priorities 
are adapted. When a new technology mismatches this broader setting, new regulatory frameworks 
may be designed. Brown et. al. point out that new technologies challenge old legal classifications as 
well as relations between legal systems (Brown et al, 2006). Each legal system has its own types of 
classifications as well as its own interpretations of how best to protect from risks and how to ensure 
safety.  
 
The examples in this paper illustrate that a range of knowledges are instrumental in the negotiation 
and adaptation of law for innovative, challenging technologies. These include articulation of moral 
values, scientific facts and societal and economic consequences that may be relevant for legal 
decision-making (Poort, 2013) and that knowledge of these is such that experts can be designated to 
bring it into the legal process. It is argued that experts soi disant are involved when dealing with 
issues in which the legislator lacks knowledge. The lack of knowledge and expert consensus is also 
explained by the complexity of the issue at stake introducing diverse types of uncertainties. Reasons 
for scientific expert involvement concern the neutrality that they may be claimed to bring in. Besides, 
scientific experts are consulted as they are seen to  ‘know more’ about issues at stake than legislators 
or regulatory policymakers, thus enabling the affordance of political legitimacy that goes beyond the 
simply technical or scientific.. Our cases show that new institutional arrangements often involve new 
expert forums or committees that focus on a specific novel aspect of the new technology. Therefore, 
different types of expertise are introduced too. Our cases demonstrate that regulatory expertise that 
can be promoted as shaping the case at handis not coterminous with scientific expertise, but also 
implies societal ,  moral and other forms of expertise. Furthermore, specialist regulatory forums may 
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adjudicate on the scope of the law that they enact, thus performing a boundary-defining function – 
defining what is and what is not commensurable with a new legal territory. 
 
At first sight, we may conclude that most relevant for deciding whether the existing framework can 
be maintained or whether new regulatory measures are required, is either the lack of scientific 
knowledge or scientific knowledge that portrays the new technology as being (very) ‘different’ from 
existing standards and modes. Scientific experts are organized or consulted for various reasons: 
neutrality, objectivity, either ‘knowing more’, or to demonstrate their representation for reasons of 
credibility of the regulation process. A perceived gap of knowledge, which cannot be bridged by 
existing regulatory frameworks and existing institutions, is of particular importance for exploring new 
regulatory measures, because this leaves the ground open for various types of knowledge, 
stakeholders’ interests and their own knowledges to be deployed. This analysis teaches us that the 
dynamics such as debate about social and cultural desirability of new technologies, and their 
industrial organisation is equally important. Therefore, ethics committees and ethics representation, 
economic analysis and societal debate additionally may play an important role in any given 
innovative technological field, although it is difficult to discern any systematic pattern of 
relationships between the framing of expertise and the maintaining/breaking strategy chosen in any 
given case.  
 
The ways in which expert knowledges are selectively mobilized in processes of legal or regulatory 
innovation, therefore, have important consequences for the development of innovative techno-
scientific fields and the industries that take them up.  Major steering principles are built into the rules 
of engagement in a field, for example in our ATMP case, allowing the controversial human embryonic 
stem cell-based products in the name of possible eventual public health gains, and shaping the 
regenerative medicine regime in a pharmaceutical frame, thus encouraging new products fitting a 
‘medicines’ rather than a ‘devices’ paradigm.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Genetically modified animals are different from natural animals; hybrid embryos are different from 
human embryos; cybrid embryos are different from hybrid embryos; cloning is different from 
breeding; cell therapy products are different from tissue engineered products. Such constructs of 
qualification of being ‘different’ have both social, economic and legal consequences, which are 
shaped through the mobilisation of a variety of modes of regulatory knowledges, which we have 
highlighted.  Both legal classifications and social/economic boundaries are challenged, which may, or 
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may not, lead to the conclusion that new regulatory frameworks are needed: the traditional legal 
classifications no longer hold and adaptation or innovation will be required. We have analysed this 
phenomenon by following both an STS approach and a legal approach to understand the concept and 
practices of regulatory knowledge and the role of experts in decision-making.   
 
An STS approach emphasizes how actors in regulatory processes interact politically while bringing 
specialist knowledge in various forms and intellectual bases into the governance domain. In 
particular, the malleable, indeterminate status of regulatable objects means that alternative 
solutions to the problem of maintaining regulatory oversight are viable. The legal approach focuses 
on legitimacy and strategies for law-making. A tension between uncertainties and legitimacy 
underpins the need for institutionalizing expert-stakeholders. Scientific expert involvement can help 
to try to ensure that knowledge gaps are bridged, and thus, legitimacy in terms of neutrality and 
accountability are strengthened. A gap of knowledge, being ‘different’, or accepted commensurable 
similarity of regulated bio-objects, as well as different legal cultures and legal systems are of 
influence on the strategy that is followed. To that extent, regulatory knowledge has to be a broad 
and rich concept, encompassing more domains than scientific and technical knowledge. 
 
We can conclude that regulatory knowledge, being relevant knowledge for deciding about 
appropriate new assessments and measurements of emerging biotechnologies, contains, besides 
scientific knowledge, also knowledge about the perceived moral desirability of a new technology, 
knowledge about the broader policy setting, procedural knowledge about political processes and 
cultures, knowledge of the economy and industrial sectors, and relevant social values. The alignment 
of these varying dimensions of knowledge is rarely easy.  Either a lack of knowledge or knowledge-
informed views that a technology essentially differs from other technologies or developments, can 
be incentives for new regulations. Scientific facts and their open-endedness must of course be 
understood in the contexts of societies and economies; knowledge about societal values and industry 
trends can shape the direction of scientific knowledge and practices. Furthermore, knowledge about 
the legal context and legal process itself is relevant to determining which strategy for maintaining 
regulation compatible with its objects – commensurating, breaking, or a combination - will be 
favoured.  
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